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Abstract
Inanirreduciblestochasticgame, nosingleplayercanpreventthestochas-
tic process on states from being irreducible, so the other players can ensure
that the current state has little effect on events in the distant future. This pa-
per introduces stochastic games with imperfect public signals, and provides
a sufﬁcient condition for the folk theorem when the game is irreducible, thus
generalizing the folk theorems of Dutta (1995) and Fudenberg, Levine, and
Maskin (1994). To prove this theorem, the paper extends the concept of
self-generation (Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990)) to “return generation,”
which explicitly tracks actions and incentives until the next time the state
returns to its current value, and asks that players not wish to deviate given
the way their continuation payoffs from the time of this return depend on the
public signals that have been observed.
Keywords: stochastic game, public monitoring, perfect public equilib-
rium, folk theorem.
¤We thank Johannes H¨ orner, Scott Kominers, and Satoru Takahashi for helpful conversations,
and Yuhta Ishi and Lauren Merril for comments on a previous draft.
†Littauer Center, Harvard University, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 021381 Introduction
Most social and economic interactions occur repeatedly, and the fact that agents
can condition their current play on information about past outcomes makes it pos-
sible to support outcomes that are not equilibria of one-shot interactions. In par-
ticular, the folk theorems for discounted repeated games show, roughly speaking,
that any feasible individually rational payoffs can be generated by an equilibrium
if the players are sufﬁciently patient. These theorems hold both in the classic
observed-actions case and also when players receive imperfect public signals of
one another’s actions.
Stochastic games (Shapley (1953)) generalize repeated games with observed
actions by allowing each period’s payoff functions to depend on a state variable
whose evolution can be inﬂuenced by the players’ actions; the state variable can
capture intertemporal links such as technological innovations, persistent demand
shocks, savings, and capital stocks. When there is an irreversible component to
the evolution of the state, single deviations can have permanent effects on the
sets of feasible and individually rational payoffs, and the structure of stochastic-
game equilibria can be very different than that of repeated games. Conversely,
if no single player can make the stochastic process irreversible- that is, when the
other players have a strategy that makes the process irreducible- then the feasible,
individually rational discounted average payoffs converge to a limit that is inde-
pendent of the current state as the discount factor converges to 1. Dutta (1995)
establishes a folk theorem for these irreducible stochastic games.
Thispaperintroducestheclassofstochasticgameswithimperfectpublicmon-
itoring, where players observe the state and public signal that is related to the
actions played, and shows that when the game is irreducible the folk theorem ap-
plies. Our proof is based on the extension of self-generation (Abreu, Pearce, and
Stachetti (1990, hereafter APS)) to “return-generation,” and on extensions of the
full-rank conditions of Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994, hereafter FLM).
The idea of return-generation is to explicitly track actions and incentives until the
next time the state returns to its current value, and then use the recursive structure
of the game to relate the equilibrium payoff in the current state to the equilibrium
continuation payoff when the current state next occurs, which will be a function
of the public signals that are observed. In our proof of the folk theorem, we
1construct a return-generating set of “Markov review strategies”: The idea is that
players condition their actions only on the state, and not on the signals of each
other’s actions, until the ﬁrst time the state returns to its initial position, and that
the incentive to conform to the speciﬁed Markov strategies is provided by the con-
tinuation payoffs from the time the state returns, which typically will depend on
the history of both states and public signals during this “review phase.”
H¨ orner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2009) independently developed a dif-
ferent proof of the folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games. They ﬁrst pro-
vide a linear programming characterization of the limit equilibrium payoffs by
using an extension of self-generation that tracks actions and incentives for the
next T periods, regardless of the realization of the state, instead of using return-
generation. They then use somewhat weaker full-rank conditions to conclude that
the solution of the linear programming problems implies the folk theorem. Be-
cause we do not provide a characterization of payoffs when the folk theorem fails,
our proof more clearly highlights the link between the folk theorem in stochastic
games and the folk theorem of FLM. We also ﬁll in the details needed to adapt
FLM’s approach to account for the fact that “convex monotonicity” fails, as we
explain in Remark 6.
2 Stochastic Games and Perfect Public Equilibria
Let I = f1;¢¢¢ ;Ig be the set of players. At the beginning of the game, Nature
chooses the state of the world w1 from a ﬁnite set W. The state may change as
time passes; let wt 2 W denote the state in period t.
In each period t, players observe the state wt 2 W, and then move simultane-
ously, with player i2 I choosing an action ai from a ﬁnite set Ai.1 Given an action
proﬁle a=(ai)i2I 2A´£i2IAi, players observe a public signal yt from a ﬁnite set
Y and the state in period t +1 is determined. Let pw(y;w0ja) denote the probabil-
ity that players observe a signal y and and the state for the next period is w0 when
today’s state is w and players play action proﬁle a. (Note that the distributions of y
and w0 may be correlated.) Player i’s realized payoff is uw
i (ai;y), so her expected
1For notational convenience, we assume that Ai does not depend on w. But with no difﬁculty
our results extend to the case where Ai depends on w.
2payoff conditional on w and a is gw
i (a) = åw02Wåy2Y pw(y;w0ja)uw
i (ai;y); gw(a)
denotes the vector of expected payoffs associated with action proﬁle a.
In the inﬁnitely repeated game, players have a common discount factor d 2
(0;1). Let (wt;at
i ;yt) be the state, player i’s pure action, and observed signal in
period t, and denote player i’s private history at the end of period t ¸ 1 by ht
i =
(wt;at
i ;yt)t
t=1. Let h0
i = / 0, and for eacht ¸1, let Ht
i be the set of all ht
i. Likewise,
a public history up to period t ¸ 1 is denoted by ht = (wt;yt)t
t=1, and Ht denotes
the set of all ht. A strategy for player i is a mapping si :
S¥
t=0Ht
i £W!4Ai: Here
si(ht;w) denotes player i’s action for period t+1 if the history through period t is
ht and the state for period t +1 is w. Let Si be the set of all strategies for player i,
and let S = £i2ISi. Let vw
i (d;s) denote player i’s average payoff in the stochastic
game when the initial state is w, the discount factor is d, and players play strategy
proﬁle s. Let vw(d;s) = (vw
i (d;s))i2I.
Remark 1. The state has to encode any and all history-dependent variation in
payoffs and signal structure, which puts some constraints on how small the state
space can be. However, because y and w are both public information, a stochastic
game with state space W and signal spaceY is equivalent to a stochastic game with
larger state space W¤ =Y £W and a null signal space. In this latter case payoffs
andstatetransitions are thesame forstates w¤ =(y;w)2W¤ and ˜ w¤ =(˜ y; ˜ w)2W¤
if w = ˜ w. However, when we restrict attention to irreducible games, we will see
that the game may be irreducible on W but not on W¤. For example when actions
are observable (Y ' A) transitions on W¤ are not irreducible but transitions on W
maybe. Roughlyspeakingwewouldlikethestatespacetobeassmallaspossible,
as in this representation our assumptions are most likely to be satisﬁed.
This paper studies a special class of Nash equilibria called perfect public equi-
libria or PPE. The notion of PPE was introduced by FLM for repeated games with
public monitoring. This paper extends their deﬁnition to stochastic games.
Deﬁnition 1. A strategy si 2 Si is public if it depends only on public information,
i.e., si(ht
i;wt+1)=si(˜ ht
i; ˜ wt+1)forallt ¸1, ht
i =(wt;at
i ;yt)t
t=1, ˜ ht
i =( ˜ wt; ˜ at
i ; ˜ yt)t
t=1,
wt+1, and ˜ wt+1 satisfying wt = ˜ wt for all t · t +1 and yt = ˜ yt for all t · t. A
strategy proﬁle s 2 S is public if si is public for all i 2 I. A public strategy is
Markov if it depends only on the current state, i.e., si(ht
i;wt+1) = si(˜ ht
i; ˜ wt+1) for
all t ¸ 1, ht
i, ˜ ht
i, wt+1, and ˜ wt+1 satisfying wt+1 = ˜ wt+1.
3Given a public strategy proﬁle s 2 S, let sjht denote its continuation strategy
proﬁle after public history ht 2 Ht, and let sj(ht;wt+1) denote the continuation strat-
egy proﬁle given (ht;wt+1) 2 Ht £W.
Deﬁnition 2. A public strategy proﬁle s is a perfect public equilibrium or PPE if
for every (ht;w) 2 Ht £W the proﬁle sj(ht;w) is a Nash equilibrium of the inﬁnite-
horizon stochastic game with initial state w. A PPE is Markov-perfect if it uses
Markov strategies.
It is a best response for each player to ignore the public signal and play a
Markov strategy if all of the other players do. Since a Markov-perfect equilibrium
exists (Sobel (1971)) there is always a PPE where all players ignore the signal.
Given a discount factor d 2 (0;1), let Ew(d) denote the set of PPE payoffs
with initial state w, i.e., Ew(d) is the set of all vectors v = (vi)i2I 2 RI such that
there is a PPE s 2 S satisfying
(1¡d)E
"
å
t=1
dt¡1gwt
i (at)
¯
¯
¯
¯
¯
s;w1 = w
#
= vi
for all i 2 I.
In repeated games, the set of all PPE payoffs at time t coincides with that
at time t +1; this recursive structure is what permits the application of dynamic
programming ideas as in the self-generation results of APS. In a stochastic game,
the set of PPE payoffs conditional on the state has a recursive structure, which
will allow us to apply a modiﬁed version of self-generation.2 Self-generation
is based on the decomposition of the set of equilibrium payoffs into the sum of
current period payoffs and continuation equilibrium payoffs from the next period
on. To develop an analog of this decomposition for stochastic games, we instead
decompose the payoffs into the sum of payoffs until the state returns to its current
value and continuation payoffs from the time of this return.
To simplify the notation, let Pr(ht;w0js;w) be the probability under proﬁle
s that the t-period public history is ht and wt+1 = w0 given that the initial state
is w. (Note that Pr(ht;w0js;w) = 0 for all ht = (wt;yt)t
t=1 such that w1 , w.)
2Just as in repeated games with imperfectly observed actions, the set of all Nash or sequential
equilibria need not have a recursive structure; see Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994, hereafter
FLM) or Exercise 5.10 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
4Also, for each t ¸ 1 and w, let ˜ Hw;t be the set of all t-period public histories
ht = (wt;yt)t
t=1 such that the state does not reach w after period two. (That is,
wt , w for 1 < t ·t.) Let ˜ Hw;t = H0 for t = 0. Let Sp denote the set of all public
strategy proﬁles.
Deﬁnition 3. For W µ RI, a pair (s;v) 2 Sp£RI of a public strategy proﬁle and
a payoff vector is enforceable with respect to d and W from state w if there is a
function w = (wi)i2I :
S¥
t=1Ht !W such that
vi =(1¡d)
"
gw
i (s(h0;w))+
¥
å
t=1 å
ht2 ˜ Hw;t å
w0,w
dt Pr(ht;w0js;w)gw0
i (s(ht;w0))
#
+
¥
å
t=1 å
ht2 ˜ Hw;t
dt Pr(ht;wjs;w)wi(ht)
for all i 2 I, and
(1¡d)
"
gw0
i (sjht(h0;w0))+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t å
w00,w
dt Pr(˜ ht;w00jsjht;w0)gw00
i (sjht(˜ ht;w00))
#
+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t
dt Pr(˜ ht;wjsjht;w0)wi((ht;˜ ht))
¸ (1¡d)
"
gw0
i (s0jht(h0;w0))+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t å
w00,w
dt Pr(˜ ht;w00js0jht;w0)gw00
i (s0jht(˜ ht;w00))
#
+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t
dt Pr(˜ ht;wjs0jht;w0)wi((ht;˜ ht))
for all i 2 I, for all s0 2 S such that s0
¡i = s¡i, for all (t;w0) such that (i) t = 0 and
w0 = w or (ii) t ¸ 1 and w0 , w, and for all ht 2 ˜ Hw;t such that w1 = w. We say
(s;v) 2 Sp£RI is enforced by w for d at w if the above conditions are satisﬁed.
Here the function w speciﬁes the continuation payoffs from the time the state
returns to w. The equality condition says that using the speciﬁed strategy will
yield the target payoff, provided that the continuation payoffs from the return
time onwards are as speciﬁed by w. The inequality condition is the incentive
compatibility at states that are reached before the return to w.3 Note that in games
with a single state, this deﬁnition of enforceability reduces to that of APS.
3To see this, suppose that the history up to period t is ht , wt+1 = w0, and consider the contin-
5For each (d;W;s), let Bw(d;W;s) denote the set of all payoff vectors v 2 RI
such that (s;v) is enforceable with respect to d and W from w. Let Bw(d;W) be
the union of Bw(d;W;s) over all s.
The ﬁrst theorem notes that the equilibrium payoff set Ew(d) is a ﬁxed point
of the operator Bw; it is the analog of the “factorization” theorem in APS.
Theorem 1. For any w 2 W and d 2 (0;1), Ew(d) = Bw(d;Ew(d)).
Proof. We ﬁrst prove Ew(d) µ Bw(d;Ew(d)). Let v 2 Ew(d). Then there is a
PPE s with payoff v for initial state is w. Since s is a PPE, nobody wants to
deviate until the state returns to w. Also, the continuation play after returning is a
PPE. Therefore v 2 Bw(d;Ew(d)), so that Ew(d) µ Bw(d;Ew(d)).
To prove the converse, we construct a PPE with payoff v 2 Bw(d;Ew(d)).
Let s and w be such that (s;v) is enforced by w and w(ht) 2 E(d). Consider a
strategy proﬁle such that players follow s until the state returns to w, and once
the state returns to w after t-period play then players play a PPE with payoff
w(ht) thereafter. It is easy to check that this strategy proﬁle is a PPE with payoff
v. Q.E.D.
The next theorem asserts that if a bounded set W is “return-generating” then
W is in the equilibrium payoff set. Note that it reduces to APS’s self-generation
theorem if there is only a single state.
Deﬁnition 4. A subset W of RI is return-generating with respect to d and initial
state w ifW µ Bw(d;W).
uation game from such that the game ends when the state reaches w. Pr(˜ ht;w00jsjht;w0) denotes
the probability that the history in the ﬁrst t periods of this continuation game is ˜ ht 2 ˜ Hw;t (so that
the state does not return to w during these periods) and the state in period t +1 is w00 , w. Also,
the stage game payoff after such a history (˜ ht;w00) (i.e., the stage game payoff in the (t +1)st
period of the continuation game) is gw00
i . Thus the ﬁrst term of left-hand side denotes the expec-
tation of the discounted sum of the stage game payoffs in this continuation game. On the other
hand, Pr(˜ ht;wjsjht;w0) denotes the probability that the history in the ﬁrst t periods of the contin-
uation game is ˜ ht 2 ˜ Hw;t and the state returns to w in period t +1, and wi((ht;˜ ht)) denotes the
continuation payoff after such a history. Thus the second term of the left-hand side denotes the
expectation of the continuation payoffs w. Overall, the left-hand side is player i’s payoff in the
continuation game corresponding to (ht;w0). Likewise, the right-hand side is player i’s payoff of
the continuation game when he deviates to s0
i.
6Theorem 2. If a subsetW of RI is bounded and return-generating with respect to
d and w then W µ Ew(d).
Proof. As in APS, we ﬁrst construct a candidate strategy proﬁle, and then note
that it has the speciﬁed payoffs and satisﬁes the no-one-stage-deviations test. In
APS the deﬁnition of self-generation is used to ﬁnd new actions in every period.
Here the fact that W is return-generated for w implies that for v 2 W there is an
associated repeated game strategy s; the construction of the overall equilibrium
speciﬁes that players conform to s until the state returns to w: Q.E.D.
Remark 2. It follows from Theorems 1 and 2 that the equilibrium payoff set
Ew(d) for a given d is the largest ﬁxed point of the operator Bw. Note that these
theorems do not assume the game is irreducible. Note also that they are vacuously
true at states w that are transient regardless of play.
Remark 3. H¨ orner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2009) use “T-period gener-
ation,” which looks T periods ahead instead of looking to the time of ﬁrst return.
In irreducible games, this property is sufﬁcient for characterizing the equilibrium
payoff set in the limit as d goes to one. However, for a ﬁxed discount factor, the
set of equilibrium payoffs need not be a ﬁxed point of the “T-period generation”
operator.
Remark 4. Our proof of the folk theorem will use “Markov return generation,”
meaning that the constructed strategies starting at w will be Markov until the state
returns to w. This restricted form of return generation is more tractable but does
not have the factorization property.
3 TheFolkTheoreminIrreducibleStochasticGames
3.1 Irreducible Stochastic Games
In general, stochastic games can be very different than inﬁnitely repeated games,
as shown by the fact that any static game can be viewed as the ﬁrst period of a
stochastic game with two states, one of which is absorbing. More generally, the
irreversibility created by absorbing states can support various sorts of backwards
induction arguments with no real analog in the inﬁnitely repeated setting. For
7the rest of this paper we will restrict attention to irreducible stochastic games;
this restriction rules out absorbing states and more strongly implies that no single
player can prevent some state from being reached.
Deﬁnition 5. A stochastic game is irreducible despite player i if for each pair of
states (w;w0) 2 W£W, there is a T > 0 and a sequence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) of states
such that w1 = w, wT = w0, and for each t < T, there is a proﬁle a such that
åy2Y pwt
(y;wt+1jai;a¡i) > 0 for all ai 2 Ai. The game is irreducible if it is irre-
ducible despite each player i.
One trivial case where our irreducibility condition is satisﬁed is when the state
represents a persistent demand shock whose evolution is independent of the play-
ers’ actions, as in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Ellison (1994). Besanko,
Doraszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2008) study an irreducible stochastic
game where the actions do inﬂuence the state transitions: In their model the state
is the knowledge or know-how of each ﬁrm, and a ﬁrm’s state increases stochas-
tically when it makes a sale, and decreases stochastically due to “organizational
forgetting.”
Let Vw(d) be the set of feasible payoffs when the initial state is w and the
discount factor is d; i.e., Vw(d) = fvw(d;s); for all s 2 Sg. Since the game is
irreducible, the set of feasible payoffs is independent of the initial state in the
limit as d goes to one. (See Dutta (1995).) Let V denote this limit set, that is,
V = limd!1Vw(d).
The minimax payoff to player i in a stochastic game with initial state w is
deﬁned to be
vw
i (d) = inf
s¡i2S¡i
sup
si2Si
vw
i (d;s):
The limit of the minimax payoff as d ! 1 is independent of the initial state from
irreducibility, again as in Dutta (1995). (See also Bewley and Kohlberg (1976)
and Mertens and Neyman (1981).) Let V¤ denote the limit of the set of feasible
and individually rational payoffs.
The following lemma records an immediate but important consequence of ir-
reducibility: For each player i, there is a Markov strategy s¡i of the opponents
so that for any pair of states (w;w0) there is strictly positive probability that the
state reaches w from w0 within jWj periods. When players are sufﬁciently patient,
8this will allow us to provide adequate current incentives with strategies that are
Markov until the state returns to its current position.
Given a Markov strategy proﬁle s, let s(w) denote the action proﬁle played by
s in state w.
Lemma 1. If the game is irreducible, then there is a Markov strategy proﬁle s¡i
such that for each pair of states (w;w0), there is an integer T > 0 and a sequence
(w1;¢¢¢ ;wT)ofstatessuchthatw1 =w, wT =w0, andåy2Y pwt
(y;wt+1jai;s¡i(wt))>
0 for all ai 2 Ai and t < T. Moreover for such s¡i there is pi 2 (0;1) such that for
each pair of states (w;w0), the state reaches w from w0 within jWj periods with at
least probability pi if players play s0 such that s0
¡i = s¡i.
Proof. One such s¡i is for players ¡i to randomize with each player using a uni-
form distribution over his actions in each state. Consider any such s¡i and ﬁx
a pair of states (w;w0), and let T > 0 and (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) be such that w1 = w,
wT = w0, and åy2Y pwt
(y;wt+1jai;s¡i(wt)) > 0 for all ai 2 Ai and t < T. With-
out loss of generality we assume T · jWj. The state reaches w from w0 within T
periods with at least probability pi(w;w0), where
pi(w;w0) =
T¡1
Õ
t=1
min
at
i2Ai å
yt2Y
pwt
(yt;wt+1jat
i;s¡i(wt)):
Letting pi be the minimum of pi(w;w0) over all (w;w0), the lemma follows.
Q.E.D.
3.2 Full Rank Conditions
As in repeated games with imperfectly observed actions, the key to whether the
folk theorem holds is whether incentives can be provided along ”hyperplanes”
that correspond to trading utility between the players at various rates, and this is
possible when the information revealed by the public outcomes permits deviations
by one player to be statistically identiﬁed and distinguished from deviations by
others. The following “full rank” conditions are sufﬁcient for this.
Foreachi, (w;w0), anda, letP
(w;w0)
i (a)beamatrixwithrows(pw(w0;yjai;a¡i))y2Y
for all ai 2 Ai. Let P
(w;w0)
(i;j) (a) be the matrix constructed by stacking matrices
P
(w;w0)
i (a) and P
(w;w0)
j (a).
9Deﬁnition 6. Proﬁle a has individual full rank for (i;w;w0) if P
(w;w0)
i (a) has
rank equal to jAij.
Note that this condition implies pw(w0jai;a¡i) > 0 for all ai. It also implies
that each action by player i leads to a different distribution on y, conditional on
a transition to w0 (though this need not be true if some other state occurs.) We
will use this in Lemmas 5 and 6 to construct return payoffs that make the player
indifferent between all of his actions.
Deﬁnition 7. For each i; j; i , j and (w;w0); proﬁle a has pairwise full rank for
(i; j) and (w;w0) if P
(w;w0)
(i;j) (a) has rank equal to jAij+jAjj¡1.
Pairwise full rank for (w;w0)implies that conditional on a transition from w to
w0 deviations by player i can be statistically distinguished from deviations by j.
It is satisﬁed for generic distributions on signals provided that jYj is at least jAij+
jAjj¡1, as in FLM, and that the transition from w to w0 has positive probability
regardless of the play of i or j.
Condition IFR. For each (w;w0) 2 W£W, there is an integer T > 0 and a se-
quence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) of states such that w1 = w, wT = w0, and for each t < T,
every pure action proﬁle has individual full rank for (wt;wt+1) and every player
i.
Condition PFR. For each (w;w0) 2 W£W, there is an integer T > 0 and a se-
quence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) of states such that w1 = w, wT = w0, and for each (i; j) and
t < T, there is a proﬁle at that has pairwise full rank for (wt;wt+1) and for (i; j).
Note that (IFR) and (PFR) are weaker than assuming that full rank conditions
aresatisﬁedforallpairsofstates (w;w0);astheseconditionsrequirefullrankonly
for certain (w;w0). Note also that (IFR) applies to all pure action proﬁles, while
(PFR) only asks that for each pair of players there is at least one proﬁle with the
stronger pairwise full rank property for that pair. These conditions are generically
satisﬁed if the game is irreducible and jYj¸jAij+jAjj¡1 for all (i; j) with i, j.4
In particular they are satisﬁed in irreducible games with observed actions, the
case studied by Dutta (1995), provided that the observations of the actions are
4These conditions could be relaxed along the lines of Kandori and Matsushima (1998).
10represented by the signal y as opposed to being embedded in the state. If the
actions are represented as part of the state then both full rank and irreducibility
fail.
3.3 The Folk Theorem
Deﬁnition 8. A subset W of RI is smooth if it is closed and convex; it has a non-
empty interior; and there is a unique unit normal for each point on the boundary
ofW.5
The following theorem is the main result of this paper; it shows that (IFR) and
(PFR) are sufﬁcient for the folk theorem.
Theorem 3. Suppose (IFR) and (PFR) hold. Then, for any smooth subsetW of the
interior of V¤, there is d 2 (0;1) such that W µ Ew(d) for all w and d 2 (d;1).
Therefore if V¤ has dimension I, then limd!1Ew(d) =V¤.
Remark 5. Because the state transitions are irreducible, it might seem natural to
consider strategies that track separate histories for each state, so that play in state
w1 depends only on observations from previous periods where the state was w1.
This approach works if the state transitions are independent of the actions, and
yields a folk theorem whenever the folk theorem holds in each state considered in
isolation. However, stratiﬁcation by the state does not work when actions have an
effect on the state transitions, as even in a control problem optimization requires
that the player take into account the way his current action inﬂuences tomorrow’s
state and thus tomorrow’s payoffs.6 For this reason our proof does not stratify the
histories by state but instead works with the game as a whole, keeping track of the
effect of actions on state transitions.
5A sufﬁcient condition for each point on the boundary of W to have a unique unit normal is
that the boundary is a C2-submanifold of RI.
6Suppose for example there are two actions a0 and a00 and three states, w1, w2, and w3; (w1;a0)
is followed by w2, and (w1;a00) is followed by w3; both w2 and w3 are followed by w1 regardless
of the action played. In state w1, a0 gives payoff 1 and a00 gives payoff 0; in state w2 payoffs are 0
regardless of the action played, while in state w3 payoffs are identically equal to 3. State-by-state
optimization leads the player to choose a0 in state w1 but this is not optimal if d > 1
3. Then even
when d is close to 1, equilibrium play for the “state w1 game” need not be consistent with overall
equilibrium, as players will give roughly equal weight to their current period payoff and the payoff
in the next period.
11Remark 6. Much of the proof of this theorem is similar to FLM: We ﬁrst develop
a local condition -one that applies pointwise to each v 2W- for a set to be return-
generating for large discount factors. We then show that the local condition is
satisﬁed under the full-rank assumptions, basically because they allow v on the
boundary ofW to be generated by continuation payoffs that lie on the hyperplanes
tangent to W at v and whose variation is of order (1¡d). One key difference
with FLM is that we use return-generation instead of self-generation to show that
various payoff vectors can be supported by equilibrium strategies. The particular
strategies that we show are return-generated have the form of stochastic review
strategies, in the sense that the strategies are Markov (depend only on the state
and not on the sequence of signals) until the state returns to w.7 The second key
difference is that the local condition, which we call “uniform decomposability,”
is more complicated then the “local self-decomposability” used in FLM’s Lemma
4.2. The reason for this is as follows. In a repeated game, if payoff vector v is
generated using a function w for some d, then v is generated by w0 for d0 2 (d;1)
where the function w0 is a convex combination of w and the constant function
v. In particular, if v and all continuation payoffs speciﬁed by w are chosen from
a convex set W, then the continuation payoffs speciﬁed by w0 are in W as well.
Using this monotonicity result, FLM show that for W to be self-generating for
sufﬁciently large d, it is sufﬁcient thatW is “locally decomposable.” In stochastic
games this monotonicity result fails because for any ﬁxed d, the payoff to a given
strategy depends on the initial state.8
7More speciﬁcally, in order to generate a target payoff, we let players follow a Markov strategy
proﬁle until the state returns to w, and we choose the continuation payoffs when the state returns
to w in such a way that no player wants to deviate. This construction requires that a player’s
deviation be statistically distinguished from a distribution of a public signal y given that the state
tomorrow is w. This is the reason why we need full-rank conditions for a distribution of y given a
state transition.
8For example, suppose there is one player and two states, w1 and w2. The state transitions
follow a cycle regardless of the actions played: w1 is followed by w2 and w2 is followed by w1.
The player has a single action (so the incentive constraint is vacuous) and his payoff is 1 in state w1
and 0 in state w2. For d0 = 1
2, the average payoff during the ﬁrst two periods is 1¡d
1¡d2(1+0) = 2
3,
so that the payoff v = 2
3 is enforced by the constant continuation payoff w0 = 2
3. On the other
hand, for d00 > 1
2, the average payoff during the ﬁrst two periods is less than 2
3, and hence for v
to be enforced, the constant continuation payoff w00 must be greater than 2
3, which is not a convex
combination of v and w0. Thus local decomposability is not sufﬁcient for self-generation, and
12We ﬁrst introduce the concept of uniform decomposability. We say that l 2 RI
is regular if it has at least two non-zero components, and is singular if it has
exactly one non-zero component. Let L be the set of all l with jlj = 1. Given
any v 2 RI, l 2 L, e > 0, K > 0, and d 2 (0;1), let Gv;l;e;K;d be the set of all v0
such that l ¢v ¸ l ¢v0 +(1¡d)e and such that v0 is within (1¡d)K of v. (See
Figure 1, where this set is labeled “G.”)
l
(1¡d)e (1¡d)K
v
W
G
Figure 1: Continuation payoff w(ht) is chosen from G.
Deﬁnition 9. A subset set W of R is uniformly decomposable for initial state w
if there are e > 0, K > 0, and d 2 (0;1) such that for all v 2 W, d 2 (d;1), and
l 2 L, there are s 2 S and w :
S¥
t=1Ht ! RI such that (s;v) is enforced by w for
d at w, and such that w(ht) 2 Gv;l;e;K;d for all t and ht.
In words, uniform decomposability requires that any v 2 W is enforced by a
function w that chooses continuation payoffs from the set Gv;l;e;K;d. Note that the
set Gv;l;e;K;d is bounded uniformly in l; indeed, for each l, the set Gv;l;e;K;d is
in the ball with center v and radius (1¡d)K.
The following lemma shows that if a smooth set W is uniformly decompos-
able, then it is return-generating for sufﬁciently large d.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a smooth and bounded subset W of RI is uniformly de-
composable for initial state w. Then there is d 2 (0;1) such that W is return-
generating for d 2 (d;1) and for w, and henceW µ Ew(d) for d 2 (d;1) and for
w.
FLM’s proof does not directly apply.
13Proof. First of all, we prove the following claim: For any smooth set W, and
for any e > 0, K, and v 2 W, there are dv 2 (0;1), lv 2 L, and an open set Uv
containing v such that for any v0 2Uv\W and d 2 (dv;1), the set Gv0;lv;e;K;d is in
W.
If v is in the interior of W, then the statement is obvious. So consider v on the
boundary of W. Let lv be a unit normal at v. Since W is smooth, its boundary is
locally ﬂat, so that (as in Fudenberg and Levine (1994)) there is dv 2 (0;1) such
that Gv;lv;e;K;dv is in the interior of W. Then there is an open set Uv containing v
such that for any v0 2Uv\W, the set Gv0;lv;e;K;dv is in the interior of W. Note that
for any d 2 (dv;1) and v0 2 Uv \W, any point v00 2 Gv0;lv;e;K;d is a strict convex
combination of v0 and some point v000 2 Gv0;lv;e;K;dv. This shows that such a v00 is
in the interior ofW, sinceW is convex, v0 is an element ofW, and v000 is an interior
point ofW. (See Figure 2.) Therefore, for any d 2 (dv;1) and v0 2Uv\W, the set
Gv0;lv;e;K;d is in the interior of W. This completes the proof of the above claim.
l
(1¡d)e
(d ¡dv)e
(1¡d)K
(d ¡dv)K
v
v00
v000
W
Figure 2: v00 is a convex combination of v and v000.
LetUv and dv be as in the claim for each v 2W. Note that fUvgv2W is an open
cover of W. Since W is compact, fUvgv2W has a ﬁnite subcover. Let d be the
maximum of dv’s on this subcover. Then the above claim implies that for each
point v 2 W, there is l 2 L such that for any d 2 (d;1), the set Gv;l;e;K;d is in
W. SinceW is uniformly decomposable, it follows thatW is return-generating for
d 2 (d;1). Q.E.D.
In what follows, we show that any smooth subset W of the interior of V¤ is
uniformly decomposable. Let SIFR
¡i (i) be the set of Markov strategies s¡i such that
14for any player i’s pure Markov strategy si and for any (w;w0) 2 W£W, there is an
integer T > 0 and a sequence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) of states such that w1 = w, wT = w0,
and for each t < T, proﬁle s(wt) has individual full rank for (wt;wt+1) and for all
j ,i. Let SIFR(i;d) be the set of Markov strategy proﬁle s such that player i’s play
is pure and optimal in every history for d and s¡i 2 SIFR
¡i (i).9 Note that SIFR(i;d)
is non-empty if (IFR) holds.
Likewise, let SPFR be the set of Markov strategy proﬁles s such that for any
(w;w0) 2 W£W, there is an integer T > 0 and a sequence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) of states
such that w1 = w, wT = w0, and for each t < T, proﬁle s(wt) has pairwise full
rank for (wt;wt+1) and for all pairs of players.
The next two lemmas are straightforward extensions of FLM: Lemma 3 shows
that SPFR is non-empty if (PFR) holds. Lemma 4 asserts that player i’s minimax
payoff can be approximated by s 2 SIFR(d;i), if (IFR) holds. The proofs are pre-
sented in Appendix.
Lemma 3. Suppose that (PFR) holds. Then the set SPFR is dense in the set of all
Markov strategy proﬁles.
Lemma 4. Suppose that (IFR) holds. Then for any w 2 W, d 2 (0;1), and e > 0,
there is s 2 SIFR(d;i) such that jvw
i (d;s)¡vw
i (d)j < e.
The next lemma is an extension of Theorem 5.1 of FLM. Roughly speaking,
it shows that any s 2 SPFR is “enforceable with respect to all regular hyperplanes,”
and that the continuation payoffs used to enforce it can be chosen to converge to
a constant at rate (1¡d). Note that the latter conclusion uses the irreducibility
assumption. As Lemma 1 shows, irreducibility assures that there is strictly posi-
tive probability that the state returns to the initial state within jWj periods. We use
this and individual full rank to show that a player’s short-run incentive to deviate
can be offset by an appropriate speciﬁcation of the continuation payoffs on return
to the initial state; the ability to do this with payoffs on the speciﬁed hyperplane
comes from the pairwise full rank assumption.
In the proof of the lemma, we explicitly construct the continuation payoffs w
as follows: We ﬁrst show that for a given state w0, player i will be indifferent
9Note the dependence on d here, which does not occur in the analogous deﬁnition in FLM.
This is because our analog of a static best response is a response that is optimal until the state
returns to w, and this sort of intermediate-horizon optimality depends on d.
15over all actions at w0 if he receives a bonus continuation payoff zw0
i when the state
evolves following a speciﬁc chain from w0 to w, with no bonus paid if the state
follows a different path. Then we deﬁne wi as the collection of the bonuses zi that
should be paid at the corresponding histories. See Appendix for a detailed proof.
Lemma 5. For each initial state w, Markov strategy proﬁle s 2 SPFR, and d 2
(0;1), there is k > 0 such that for each regular direction l 2 L, there is K > 0
such that for each d 2 (d;1) and for each v 2 RI such that l ¢vw(d;s) ¸ l ¢v,
there is w such that
(i) (s;v) is enforced by w for d at w,
(ii) l ¢ w(ht) is independent of t and ht and l ¢ w(ht) · l ¢ v ¡ (1 ¡ d)(l ¢
vw(d;s)¡l ¢v), and
(iii) jv¡w(ht)j < (1¡d)(kjvw(d;s)¡vj+K) for each t and ht.
The next lemma is an extension of Lemma 5.2 of FLM; it shows that any
s 2 SIFR is “enforceable with respect to all coordinate hyperplanes orthogonal to
the ith coordinate axis.” Here we choose player i’s strategy si depending on d,
since player i’s best reply against s¡i might vary with the discount factor. Again,
the proof can be found in Appendix.
Lemma 6. For each initial state w, Markov strategy s¡i 2 SIFR
¡i (i), and d 2 (0;1),
there is k > 0 such that for each direction l such that li , 0 and lj = 0 for all
j , i, there is K > 0 such that for each d 2 (d;1) and for each v 2 RI such that
livi ·limaxs0
ivw
i (d;s0
i;s¡i), there is player i’s pure Markov strategy si and w such
that
(i) (s;v) is enforced by w for d at w,
(ii) liwi(ht)isindependentoft andht andliwi(ht)·livi¡(1¡d)li(maxs0
ivw
i (d;s0
i;s¡i)¡
vi), and
(iii) jv¡w(ht)j < (1¡d)(kjvw(d;s)¡vj+K) for each t and ht.
The previous lemmas each apply for a given d; the next lemma states conclu-
sions that hold for all d sufﬁciently close to 1. The proof is given in Appendix.
16Lemma 7. Suppose that (IFR) and (PFR) hold. Then for any initial state w 2 W
and for any smooth subset W of the interior of V¤, there are e > 0 and d 2 (0;1)
such that the following properties hold:
(a) There is a ﬁnite set of Markov strategy proﬁles fs1;¢¢¢ ;sNg such that sn 2
SPFR foralln, andforeveryd 2(d;1)andforeveryregularl 2L, maxn2f1;¢¢¢;Ngl ¢
vn > maxv2W l ¢v+e, where vn = vw(d;sn).
(b) For each i2 I and for each l such that jlij=1 and lj =0 for all j ,i, there
is s¡i 2 SIFR
¡i (i) such that for every d 2 (d;1), there is player i’s Markov
strategy si such that s = (si;s¡i) 2 SIFR(d;i) and l ¢v > maxv02W l ¢v0+e,
where v = vw(d;s).
Now we are in a position to prove uniform decomposability of a smooth sub-
set W of the interior of V¤. A main point in the proof is that the variation in
continuation payoffs needed to enforce a given limit payoff v on the hyperplane
corresponding to l is bounded uniformly in l.
Lemma 8. Suppose that (IFR) and (PFR) hold. Then any smooth subsetW of the
interior of V¤ is uniformly decomposable for any initial state w 2 W.
Proof. Fix w and W. Fix d 2 (0;1) and ˜ e so that Lemma 7 holds. Applying
Lemmas 5 and 6 to the strategy proﬁles speciﬁed in Lemma 7, it follows that there
is k > 0 such that for each l 2 L, there is ˜ Kl > 0 such that for each d 2 (d;1)
and v 2W, there is a Markov strategy proﬁle sv;l;d and a function ˜ wv;l;d such that
(i) (sv;l;d;v) is enforced by ˜ wv;l;d for d at w,
(ii) l ¢ ˜ wv;l;d(ht) · l ¢v¡(1¡d)˜ e for each t and ht, and
(iii) jv¡w(ht)j < (1¡d)(kjvw(d;sv;l;d)¡vj+ ˜ Kl) for each t and ht.
Set e = ˜ e
2, and for each l 2L, let Kl >k2jvw(d;sv;l;d)¡vj+ ˜ Kl for all v2W
and d 2 (d;1). Then it follows from (ii) and (iii) that wv;l;d(ht) 2 Gv;l;2e;Kl;d for
all t and ht.
Note that for each v2W and l 2L, there is an open setUv;l;d µ RI containing
l such that l0¢v ¸ l0¢wv;l;d(ht)+(1¡d)e for all t, ht, and l0 2 L\Uv;l;d. In
17particular, since W is bounded, there is Ul;d µ RI containing l such that l0¢v ¸
l0¢wv;l;d(ht)+(1¡d)e for all t, ht, v 2W and l0 2 L\Ul;d.
The set L is compact, so fUl;dgl2L has a ﬁnite subcover fUl;dgl2L¤. For
each v and l, let s¤
v;l;d = sv;l0;d and w¤
v;l;d(ht) = wv;l0;d(ht), where l0 2 L¤ is
such that l 2 Ul0;d. Then letting K = maxl2L¤Kl, the speciﬁed (s¤
v;l;d;w¤
v;l;d)
satisﬁes all the desired conditions for a given l 2 L; that is, (s¤
v;l;d;v) is enforced
by w¤
v;l;d and w¤
v;l;d chooses the continuation payoffs from the set Gv;l;e;K;d. Note
that now K is independent of l, and hence the proof is completed. Q.E.D.
4 Conclusion
Our results leave open many interesting avenues of research. One of them is
whether the folk theorem for stochastic games holds when strategies are restricted
to have ﬁnite memory, as it does in games with a single state (H¨ orner and Ol-
szewski (2009)). A second is to suppose that the discount factor tends to one
because time periods grow short, so that the state transition probabilities will
vary with the discount factor; we explore this in ongoing research with Johannes
Horner. Yet another extension is to allow for private information about the time-
varying state, as in Athey and Bagwell (2008) and Escobar and Toikka (2009).
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3. Suppose that (PFR) holds. Then the set SPFR is dense in the set of all
Markov strategy proﬁles.
Proof. For each w 2 W, let W(w) denote the set of all w0 2 W such that for each
pair (i; j) of players, there is a proﬁle a that has pairwise full rank for (i; j) and
(w;w0). Let APFR(w;w0) be the set of all action proﬁles a that has pairwise
full rank for (w;w0) and for all pairs of players. As Lemma 6.2 of FLM shows,
the set APFR(w;w0) is open and dense in the set of all action proﬁles for each
w 2 W and w0 2 W(w). Let APFR(w) =
T
w02W(w)APFR(w;w0). Then APFR(w)
is open and dense in the set of all action proﬁles. Note that under (PFR), for
18any pair (w;w0), there is an integer T and a sequence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) such that
w1 = w, wT = w0, and wt+1 2 W(wt) for all t < T. Thus we have s 2 SPFR for
any Markov strategy proﬁle s such that s(w)2APFR(w) for all w. This shows that
SPFR contains £w2WAPFR(w). Therefore SPFR is dense in the set of all Markov
strategy proﬁles. Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4. Suppose that (IFR) holds. Then for any w 2 W, d 2 (0;1), and e > 0,
there is s 2 SIFR(d;i) such that jvw
i (d;s)¡vw
i (d)j < e.
Proof. For each w 2 W, let W(w) denote the set of all w0 2 W such that any pure
action proﬁle has individual full rank for (w;w0) and for all players. For each
ai 2 Ai, let C(w;w0;ai) denote the set of all a¡i such that the proﬁle (ai;a¡i) has
individual full rank for all j ,i and for (w;w0). As Lemma 6.3 of FLM shows, the
setC(w;w0;ai) is open and dense in the set of all a¡i, for each w 2W, w0 2W(w),
andai 2Ai. LetC(w)=
T
w02W(w)
T
aiC(w;w0;ai). LetC=£w2WC(w). ThenC is
dense in the set of all Markov strategy proﬁles. Since (IFR) holds, for any Markov
strategy proﬁle s in C and for any (w;w0), there is a sequence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) of
states such that for each t, s(wt) has individual full rank for (wt;wt+1) and for all
j , i.
Let s be a minimax proﬁle against player i for d and for initial state w. Without
loss of generality, s is Markov, so write it as (s(w))w2W. SinceC is dense, there is
a sequence f(sk
¡i(w))w2Wg¥
k=1 converging to (s¡i(w))w2W with (sk
¡i(w))w2W 2C
for all k. Let sk
i be a best response to (sk
¡i(w))w2W. Without loss of general-
ity sk
i is pure and Markov, so write it by (sk
i(w))w2W. By deﬁnition of C, for
any pair (w;w0), there is an integer T and a sequence (w1;¢¢¢ ;wT) such that
w1 = w, wT = w0, and for each t < T, the proﬁle (sk
i(wt);sk
¡i(wt)) has indi-
vidual full rank for all j , i and for (wt;wt+1). Choose (si(w))w2W and a sub-
sequence of f(sk
i(w);sk
¡i(w))w2Wg¥
k=1 such that (sk
i(w))w2W =(si(w))w2W. Since
(sk
¡i(w))w2W convergesto(s¡i(w))w2W, (si(w))w2W isabestreplyto(s¡i(w))w2W
and gives vw
i (d) to player i. Therefore for any e > 0, there is k such that the
Markov strategy proﬁle corresponding to (sk(w))w2W satisﬁes all the desired con-
ditions. Q.E.D.
19A.3 Proof of Lemma 5
Lemma 5. For each initial state w, Markov strategy proﬁle s 2 SPFR, and d 2
(0;1), there is k > 0 such that for each regular direction l 2 L, there is K > 0
such that for each d 2 (d;1) and for each v 2 RI such that l ¢vw(d;s) ¸ l ¢v,
there is w such that
(i) (s;v) is enforced by w for d at w,
(ii) l ¢ w(ht) is independent of t and ht and l ¢ w(ht) · l ¢ v ¡ (1 ¡ d)(l ¢
vw(d;s)¡l ¢v), and
(iii) jv¡w(ht)j < (1¡d)(kjvw(d;s)¡vj+K) for each t and ht.
Proof. Fix w, s, l, d, and v. Since s 2 SPFR, for each w0 there is an inte-
ger T(w0) > 0 and a sequence (wt(w0))
T(w0)
t=1 of states such that w1(w0) = w0,
wT(w0) = w, and for each t < T(w0), proﬁle s(wt¡1(w0)) has pairwise full rank
for each (i; j) for (wt¡1(w0);wt(w0)). To simplify the notation, we denote this se-
quence by ~ w(w0), that is, ~ w(w0) = (wt(w0))
T(w0)
t=1 Note that ~ w(w0) is a path from
w0 to w that occurs with positive probability even if player i unilaterally deviates.
Given each w0, consider the “return game” such that the game starts at initial
state w0 (instead of w) and ends when the state reaches w, and player i obtains a
payment ˜ vi at the end of the game, where
˜ vi =
vi¡(1¡d)
h
gw
i (s(w))+å
¥
t=1å˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t åw00,w dt Pr(˜ ht;w00js;w)gw00
i (s(w00))
i
å
¥
t=1åht2 ˜ Hw;t dt Pr(ht;wjs;w)
:
(1)
Let vw0
i denote player i’s payoff in this return game when players follow the
Markov strategy proﬁle s, that is,
vw0
i =(1¡d)
"
gw0
i (s(w0))+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t å
w00,w
dt Pr(˜ ht;w00js;w0)gw00
i (s(w00))
#
+
¥
å
t=1 å
ht2 ˜ Hw;t
dt Pr(ht;wjs;w0)˜ vi:
Also, let vw0
i (a1
i ) denote the analogous value when player i chooses a1
i 2 Ai in the
initial period of the return game and then follows s. Note that, from (1), we have
20vw
i = vi. That is, the payment ˜ vi is chosen in such a way that player i’s payoff in
the return game from initial state w with constant payment ˜ vi is equal to vi.
Choose fzw0
i (y1)g(i;y1)2I£Y in such a way that player i is indifferent over all
actions in the ﬁrst period of the return game from initial state w0 with constant
payment ˜ vi supposing that all players follow s in all periods t > 1 and that player
i receives a bonus zw0
i (y1) in period two when the evolution of states follows
(w1(w0);w2(w0)), while he receives no bonus when the state reaches other state
w00 , w2(w0) in period two. That is, let fzw0
i (y1)g(i;y1)2I£Y be such that
vw0
i = vw0
i (a1
i )+d å
y12Y
zw0
i (y1)pw1(w0)(y1;w2(w0)ja1
i ;s¡i(w1(w0))) (2)
for all i and a1
i 2 Ai. The existence of such fzw0
i (y1)g is guaranteed, because the
proﬁle s(w1(w0)) has pairwise full rank for (w1(w0);w2(w0)) so that the state
moves from w1(w0) to w2(w0) with positive probability regardless of player i’s
action, and the coefﬁcient matrix of system (2) has full rank. In particular, as in
Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 of FLM, fzw0
i (y1)g can be set to lie on a hyperplane orthog-
onal to l, that is,
å
i2I
lizw0
i (y1) = 0 (3)
for all y1 2Y.10
For w0 such that T(w0)>2, we recursively construct fzw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt)g(i;y1;¢¢¢;yt)
for each t 2 f2;¢¢¢ ;T(w0)¡1g as follows. Intuitively, zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt) is a bonus
paidtoplayeriinperiodt+1ofthereturngamefromw0 withconstantpayment ˜ vi,
when the evolution of states is precisely (wt(w0))t+1
t=1. Let t 2 f2;¢¢¢ ;T(w0)¡1g
and fzw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt¡1)g be given. We choose fzw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt)g in such a way that,
in the return game from state w0, giving the bonus zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt¡1) in period t is
equivalent to giving the bonus zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt) in period t +1, regardless of player
i’s play in period t. That is,
zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt¡1) = d å
yt2Y
zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt)pwt(w0)(yt;wt+1(w0)jat
i;s¡i(wt(w0)))
(4)
10Here each row of the coefﬁcient matrix P
(w1(w0);w2(w0))
(i;j) (s(w1(w0)) may not be a probability
distribution and some rows can have larger norm than others. But since the rows of the matrix are
linearly independent the resulting linear system still has a solution.
21for all i and at
i 2 Ai. Again, the existence of the fzw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt)gis guaranteed
because the proﬁle s(wt(w0)) has pairwise full rank for (wt(w0);wt+1(w0)). Also,
fzw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt)g can be set to lie on a hyperplane orthogonal to l. That is,
å
i2I
lizw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt) = 0 (5)
for all (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt).
By construction, in the return game from state w0, giving the bonus zw0
i (y1)
in period two when the evolution of states follows (w1(w0);w2(w0)) is equiva-
lent to giving the bonus zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1) in period T(w0) when the evolution
of states follows the sequence ~ w(w0). Therefore, player i is indifferent over all
actions in the ﬁrst period of the return game from state w0 with constant pay-
ment ˜ vi, if players do not deviate from s in period t > 1 and if player i receives
zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1) in period T(w0) when the evolution of states follows the se-
quence ~ w(w0), with no bonus if the evolution of states does not follow this se-
quence. Indeed, from (2) and (4), we obtain
vw0
i =vw0
i (a1
i )
+dT(w0) å
(y1;¢¢¢;yT(w0)¡1)
zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1)
T(w0)¡1
Õ
t=1
pwt(w0)(yt;wt+1(w0)jat
i;s¡i(wt(w0)))
for all i and (a1
i ;¢¢¢ ;a
T(w0)¡1
i ) 2 (Ai)T(w0)¡1, which implies indifference in the
ﬁrst period. Note also that the above equality holds for all (a1
i ;¢¢¢ ;a
T(w0)¡1
i ) 2
(Ai)T(w0)¡1, so that player i’s action in period t > 1 of the return game does not
affect the expectation of zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1). Moreover, from (3) and (5), the
fzw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1)g lie on the hyperplane orthogonal to l, i.e.,
å
i2I
lizw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1) = 0 (6)
for all (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1).
Now we are in a position to construct w. We construct w in such a way that at
the end of the return game, player i receives a constant payment ˜ vi plus a bonus
contingentonthepastpublichistory. Speciﬁcally, givenanyt andw0, ifthestatein
period t is w0 and if the evolution of states follows the sequence ~ w(w0) thereafter,
then player i receives a bonus zw0
i (yt;¢¢¢ ;yt+T(w0)¡2) in period t +T(w0)¡1 (i.e.,
22when the state reaches the end of the chain wT(w0)(w0) = w so that the game
ends). By the deﬁnition of zw0
i , this return payoff makes player i indifferent over
all actions in any period t with any state w0. Note that the sequences for two (or
more) different states might overlap; for example, there might be w0 and w00 , w0
such that for some t, (wt(w0))
T(w0)
t=t = ~ w(w00). In this case we construct w in such
a way that player i receives both zw0
i and zw00
i simultaneously if the recent evolution
of states is ~ w(w0).
Theformalspeciﬁcationofwisasfollows. Foreachhistoryht =(wt;yt)t
t=1 2
˜ Hw;t, let W(ht) be the set of all w0 2 W such that the sequence of states for the last
T(w0)¡1 periods is identical to (w1(w0);¢¢¢ ;wT(w0)¡1(w0)), i.e., W(ht) is the set
of all w0 2 W such that (wt¡T(w0)+2;¢¢¢ ;wt) = (w1(w0);¢¢¢ ;wT(w0)¡1(w0)). Note
that if the history up to period t is ht and the state returns to w in period t+1, then
the recent evolution of states is exactly the sequence ~ w(w0) for each w0 2 W(ht).
Thus we pay zw0
i (yt¡T(w0)+2;¢¢¢ ;yt) to player i after such a history. Speciﬁcally,
we set
wi(ht) = ˜ vi+ å
w02W(ht)
zw0
i (yt¡T(w0)+2;¢¢¢ ;yt):
That is, the continuation payoff wi(ht) when the public history up to period t is ht
and the state returns to w in period t+1 is a sum of the constant payment vw
i (d;s)
and the bonuses zw0
i (yt¡T(w0)+2;¢¢¢ ;yt) for all w0 such that the recent evolution of
states is exactly ~ w(w0).
This w enforces (s;v) because it makes each player exactly indifferentbetween
all actions, and it yields payoff v, by construction. (Recall that ˜ vi is chosen so that
vw
i = vi.) Therefore clause (i) follows, and it remains to show clauses (ii) and (iii).
To simplify the notation, let
xw0
=
¥
å
t=1 å
ht2 ˜ Hw;t
dt Pr(ht;wjs;w0)
and
xw0
i = gw0
i (s(w0))+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t å
w00,w
dt Pr(˜ ht;w00js;w0)gw00
i (s(w00)):
Note that player i’s payoff in the original stochastic game from state w is vw
i (d;s),
if players play s. Also, since s is Markov, player i’s payoff in the continuation
game such that the current state is w is vw
i (d;s) as well. Therefore player i’s
23payoff when players play s in the return game from state w with constant payment
vw
i (d;s) is equal to vw
i (d;s); that is,
vw
i (d;s) = (1¡d)xw
i +xwvw
i (d;s):
Arranging,
vw
i (d;s) =
(1¡d)xw
i
1¡xw : (7)
Recall that ˜ vi =
vi¡(1¡d)xw
i
xw . Plugging (7) to this, we have
˜ vi = vi¡
1¡xw
xw (vw
i (d;s)¡vi) (8)
for all i 2 I so that
l ¢ ˜ v = l ¢v¡
1¡xw
xw (l ¢vw(d;s)¡l ¢v):
Then it follows from (6) that
l ¢w(ht) = l ¢v¡
1¡xw
xw (l ¢vw(d;s)¡l ¢v)
for all t and ht. Since 0 < xw < d, we have 1¡xw
xw > 1¡d for any d. Then for any
d and v, l ¢w(ht) · l ¢v¡(1¡d)(l ¢vw(d;s)¡l ¢v). This proves clause (ii).
Next we prove (iii). Letting pi be as in Lemma 1, it follows that if players ¡i
play the strategy s, then given any period t, the state reaches w within jWj periods
with at least probability pi. Therefore,
1¡xw0
= 1¡
¥
å
t=1 å
ht2 ˜ Hw;t
dt Pr(ht;wjs;w0)
· 1¡
¥
å
t=1
dtjWj(1¡ pi)t¡1pi
= 1¡
pidjWj
1¡djWj(1¡ pi)
=
1¡djWj
1¡djWj(1¡ pi)
· (1¡d)
jWj
pi
24so that 1¡xw0
is of order (1¡d). Also, letting g¤
i =maxw02Wmaxa2Ajgw0
i (a)j, we
have
jxw0
i j · jgw0
i (s(w0))j+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t å
w00,w
dt Pr(˜ ht;w00js;w0)
¯
¯
¯gw00
i (s(w00))
¯
¯
¯
·
¥
å
t=0
(1¡ pi)tjWjg¤
i =
jWjg¤
i
pi
so that (1¡d)xw0
i is of order (1¡d).
Since vw0
i = (1¡d)xw0
i +xw0
˜ vi and both (1¡d)xw0
i and 1¡xw0
are of order
(1¡d), it follows that vw0
i ¡ ˜ vi is of order (1¡d). Likewise, one can check that
vw0
i (ai)¡ ˜ vi is of order (1¡d) for all ai 2 Ai. Then without loss of generality we
can let zw0
i (y1) be of order (1¡d). (This follows from the fact that vw0
i ¡vw0
i (ai)
is of order (1¡d) and that the coefﬁcient matrix corresponding to (2) and (3) is
independent of d. If the coefﬁcient matrix has many more columns than rows,
then there are inﬁnitely many solutions, but we can still select zw0
i (y1) so that it is
of order (1¡d).) Similarly, we can let zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yt) be of order (1¡d). Thus
there is K > 0 such that åi2Ijåw02W(ht)zw0
i (yt¡T(w0)+2;¢¢¢ ;yt)j < K(1¡d) for
any t and ht. Also, since 1¡xw is of order (1¡d), given any d 2 (0;1), there
is k > 0 such that 1¡xw
xw < (1¡d)k for any d 2 (d;1). Then it follows from (8)
that j˜ v¡vj < (1¡d)kjvw(d;s)¡vj for any d 2 (d;1) and v. This proves clause
(iii). Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 6. For each initial state w, Markov strategy s¡i 2 SIFR
¡i (i), and d 2 (0;1),
there is k > 0 such that for each direction l such that li , 0 and lj = 0 for all
j , i, there is K > 0 such that for each d 2 (d;1) and for each v 2 RI such that
livi ·limaxs0
ivw
i (d;s0
i;s¡i), there is player i’s pure Markov strategy si and w such
that
(i) (s;v) is enforced by w for d at w,
(ii) liwi(ht)isindependentoft andht andliwi(ht)·livi¡(1¡d)li(maxs0
ivw
i (d;s0
i;s¡i)¡
vi), and
(iii) jv¡w(ht)j < (1¡d)(kjvw(d;s)¡vj+K) for each t and ht.
25Proof. Fix s¡i 2 SIFR
¡i (i), l, d, and v. we ﬁnd si and w(ht) satisfying the desired
conditions.
We ﬁrst specify si. Given any Markov strategy s0
i, let
˜ vi(s0
i)=
vi¡(1¡d)
"
gw
i (s0
i(w);s¡i(w))
+å
¥
t=1å˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t åw00,w dt Pr(˜ ht;w00js0
i;s¡i;w)gw00
i (s0
i(w00);s¡i(w00))
#
å
¥
t=1åht2 ˜ Hw;t dt Pr(ht;wjs0
i;s¡i;w)
:
That is, ˜ vi(s0
i) is chosen in such a way that vi is achieved as player i’s payoff in
the return game from w to w when players play (s0
i;s¡i) and player i receives the
constant payment ˜ vi(s0
i) at the end of the return game. Let F(si) be the set of
player i’s optimal Markov strategies against s¡i in the return game from state w
with constant payment ˜ vi(si). The correspondence F is non-empty-valued, convex
valued, andhas closedgraph, soby Kakutani’sﬁxedpoint theorem, there is ˜ si such
that ˜ si 2F(˜ si). We denote ˜ vi(˜ si) by ˜ vi, and let si be player i’s pure Markov strategy
such that si is a best reply against s¡i in the return game with constant payment ˜ vi.
By construction, player i’s payoff in the return game from state w with constant
payment ˜ vi is vi, if players play s.
Next we construct w. For each j , i, let ˜ vj, vw0
j , and vw0
j (aj) be as in the proof
of Lemma 5. Since s¡i 2 SIFR
¡i (d), for each w0 there is an integer T(w0) > 0 and a
sequence (wt(w0))T
t=1 of states such that w1(w0) = w0, wT(w0) = w, and for each
t <T(w0), the proﬁle s(wt¡1(w0)) has individual full rank for (wt¡1(w0);wt(w0))
andforall j,i. ThenasintheproofofLemma5, therearefzw0
j (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1)g
such that
vw0
j =vw0
i (a1
j)+dT(w0) å
(y1;¢¢¢;yT(w0)¡1)
zw0
j (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1)
T(w0)¡1
Õ
t=1
pwt(w0)(yt;wt+1(w0)jat
j;s¡j(wt(w0)))
for all j , i and (a1
j;¢¢¢ ;a
T(w0)¡1
j ). Let zw0
i (y1;¢¢¢ ;yT(w0)¡1) = 0. For each history
ht, let W(ht) be the set of all w0 2 W such that the sequence of states for the last
T(w0)¡1 periods is identical to (w1(w0);¢¢¢ ;wT(w0)¡1(w0)). Then let
wj(ht) = ˜ vj+ å
w02W(ht)
zw0
j (yt¡T(w0)+2;¢¢¢ ;yt)
for each j 2 I.
26Now we show that the above (s;w) satisﬁes all the desired conditions. As in
the proof of Lemma 5, player j ,i is indifferent over all actions in every period so
that his incentive compatibility is satisﬁed. Also, player i’s incentive compatibility
is satisﬁed as well, because si is deﬁned to be a best reply in the return game. In
addition, v is generated using (s;w), as ˜ v is chosen in such a way that the payoff
of the return game is v. Therefore, clause (i) follows.
Let s¤
i be a Markov strategy such that s¤
i 2 maxs0
iww
i (d;s0
i;s¡i). Let
x¤ =
¥
å
t=1 å
ht2 ˜ Hw;t
dt Pr(ht;wjs¤
i ;s¡i;w)
and
x¤
i =gw0
i (s¤
i (w);s¡i(w))+
¥
å
t=1 å
˜ ht2 ˜ Hw;t å
w00,w
dt Pr(˜ ht;w00js¤
i ;s¡i;w)gw00
i (s¤
i (w00);s¡i(w00)):
Note that player i’s payoff in the return game from state w with constant payment
vw
i (d;s¤
i ;s¡i) is equal to vw
i (d;s) when players play (s¤
i ;s¡i); that is,
vw
i (d;s¤
i ;s¡i) = (1¡d)x¤
i +x¤vw
i (d;s¤
i ;s¡i):
Arranging,
vw
i (d;s¤
i ;s¡i) =
(1¡d)x¤
i
1¡x¤ : (9)
Recall that playing si is optimal in the return game from state w with constant
payment ˜ vi, and its payoff is vi. Therefore playing s¤
i can yield at most vi in this
return game, i.e.,
vi ¸ (1¡d)x¤
i +x¤˜ vi:
Plugging (9) to this,
˜ vi · vi¡
1¡x¤
x¤ (vw
i (d;s¤
i ;s¡i)¡vi):
Then for li > 0,
liwi(ht) = li˜ vi · livi¡
1¡x¤
x¤ li(vw
i (d;s¤
i ;s¡i)¡vi):
Also, letting xw be as in the proof of Lemma 5, we have (8) so that for li < 0,
liwi(ht)=li˜ vi =livi¡
1¡xw
xw li(vw
i (d;s)¡vi)·livi¡
1¡xw
xw li(vw
i (d;s¤
i ;s¡i)¡vi):
27Then clause (ii) follows for either case, since 0 < x¤ < d and 0 < xw < d. Also,
clause (iii) follows as in the proof of Lemma 5. Note in particular that we can
choose k and K independently of the speciﬁcation of si, as the number of player
i’s pure Markov strategies is ﬁnite. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 7
Lemma 7. Suppose that (IFR) and (PFR) hold. Then for any initial state w 2 W
and for any smooth subset W of the interior of V¤, there are e > 0 and d 2 (0;1)
such that the following properties hold:
(a) There is a ﬁnite set of Markov strategy proﬁles fs1;¢¢¢ ;sNg such that sn 2
SPFR foralln, andforeveryd 2(d;1)andforeveryregularl 2L, maxn2f1;¢¢¢;Ngl ¢
vn > maxv2W l ¢v+e, where vn = vw(d;sn).
(b) For each i2 I and for each l such that jlij=1 and lj =0 for all j ,i, there
is s¡i 2 SIFR
¡i (i) such that for every d 2 (d;1), there is player i’s Markov
strategy si such that s = (si;s¡i) 2 SIFR(d;i) and l ¢v > maxv02W l ¢v0+e,
where v = vw(d;s).
Proof. Since W is in the interior of V¤, there is e > 0 such that maxv2V¤l ¢v >
maxv2W l ¢v+6e for all l 2 L. In what follows, we consider a ﬁxed initial state
w.
Part (a). Let f˜ v1;¢¢¢ ; ˜ vNg be the ﬁnite set of all extreme points of the feasible
set V. As Dutta (1995) shows, each extreme point of V is attainable by a pure
Markov strategy proﬁle in the no-discounting case. Let f˜ s1;¢¢¢ ; ˜ sNg be the set
of pure Markov strategy proﬁles that achieve these extreme points. Then from
Lemma 3, there is a nearby Markov strategy proﬁle sn such that sn 2 SPFR and
l ¢vn is within e of l ¢ ˜ vn for sufﬁciently large d, where vn = vw(d;sn). (The latter
condition holds from Abel’s theorem: the limit payoff of a Markov strategy proﬁle
is equal to its time-average payoff. See also (A.2) of Dutta (1995).) This proves
part (a).
Part (b). We ﬁrst prove the following claim: There is d 2 (0;1) such that for
any d 2 (d;1), for any i 2 I, and for any Markov strategy proﬁle s, jvw
i (d;s)¡
limd!1vw
i (d;s)j < e. The key here is that d 2 (0;1) is cohesions independently
28of i and s. To prove the claim, note ﬁrst that for a given pure Markov strategy
proﬁle s, there is d 2 (0;1) such that jvw
i (d;s)¡limd0!1vw
i (d0;s)j < e for any
i2I and d 2(d;1). Since the action space and the state space are ﬁnite, it follows
that there is d 2 (0;1) such that jvw
i (d;s)¡limd0!1vw
i (d0;s)j < e for any i 2 I,
for any d 2 (d;1), for any pure Markov strategy proﬁle s. One can check that
this inequality remains true even for a mixed Markov strategy proﬁle s, since the
payoff from a mixed Markov strategy proﬁle is a convex combination of those
from pure Markov strategy proﬁles. This shows the claim. In what follows, let d
be as in the claim.
Consider l such that li = 1 and lj = 0 for all j , i. Given a d, let s(d) be a
strategy proﬁle that gives the highest discounted average payoff to player i when
the initial state is w. Without loss of generality we assume that s(d) is pure and
Markov for all d. It is easy to see that for d sufﬁciently close to one, player i’s
discounted average payoff from s(d) is within e of his highest payoff of the limit
feasible setV. This, together with the above claim, shows that there is d¤ 2 (d;1)
such that for every d 2 (d¤;1),
¯
¯
¯
¯vw
i (d;s(d¤))¡max
v02V
l ¢v0
¯
¯
¯
¯ < 2e: (10)
Choose such d¤ and let s¤ denote s(d¤). For each d 2 (d¤;1), let sd
i be player i’s
pure Markov strategy that is optimal against s¤
¡i for d. We will show that for each
d 2 (d¤;1), the proﬁle (sd
i ;s¤
¡i) satisﬁes the desired properties.
Since s¤ gives the highest payoff to player i for d¤, we have vw
i (d¤;s¤) ¸
vw
i (d¤;sd
i ;s¤
¡i). Likewise, since sd
i is a best reply for d, we have vw
i (d;s¤) ·
vw
i (d;sd
i ;s¤
¡i). Also, from the aboveclaim, we obtain jvw
i (d¤;s¤)¡vw
i (d;s¤)j<2e
and jvw
i (d¤;sd
i ;s¤
¡i)¡vw
i (d;sd
i ;s¤
¡i)j<2e for every d 2(d¤;1). These inequalities
yield jvw
i (d¤;s¤)¡vw
i (d;sd
i ;s¤
¡i)j < 2e. Plugging this into (10), it follows that
¯
¯
¯
¯vw
i (d;sd
i ;s¤
¡i)¡max
v02V
l ¢v0
¯
¯
¯
¯ < 4e
for every d 2 (d¤;1). Since maxv2V l ¢v > maxv2V¤l ¢v > maxv2W l ¢v+6e, it
follows that l ¢vw(d;sd
i ;s¤
¡i) > maxv2W l ¢v+e, as desired. Also, by deﬁnition,
(sd
i ;s¤
¡i) 2 SIFR(d;i).
Next we consider l such that li = ¡1 and lj = 0 for all j , i. Lemma 4 says
that for any d, there is a Markov strategy proﬁle s(d) such that s(d) 2 SIFR(d;i)
29and player i’s payoff is within e of vi(d). Since vi(d) approximates maxv02V¤l ¢v0
as d goes to one, the above claim implies that there is d¤ 2 (d;1) such that for
every d 2 (d¤;1),
¯
¯
¯
¯vw
i (d;s(d¤))¡ max
v02V¤l ¢v0
¯
¯
¯
¯ < 3e:
Choose such d¤, and let s¤ denote s(d¤). For each d 2 (d¤;1), let sd
i be player
i’s pure Markov strategy that is optimal against s¤
¡i for d. Then as in the previous
case, we can show that this (sd
i ;s¤
¡i) satisﬁes the desired properties. Q.E.D.
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